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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This is the second instalment of a two-part article series aimed at 
examining community property claims through the lens of the personality 
theory of property. The overarching aim of these two articles is to expose 
the imbalance between communal and private property arrangements by 
justifying communal property claims through the use of the personality 
theory of property (also referred to as ‘property and personhood’, or the 
‘personhood perspective), which is traditionally used to justify private 
property claims. It is argued that if a community of users can establish a 
claim within the personhood perspective, that claim should be treated with 
the same respect as a private property claim founded through the same 
mechanism. Where competing claims to natural resources exist (with a 
specific focus on land), it should not always be the private property claim 
of an individual landowner that takes priority when the other claimant is a 
community of users. If both claims can be justified through the same 
mechanism, both should be treated with equal weight and consideration.  
It will be remembered from part I that the Hegelian and neo-Hegelian 
conceptions of the personhood theory were introduced. In particular, the 
work of Professor Radin was explored. Radin presented a theory in which 
a fully constituted person projects his personality into the world and 
embodies their will and personality in external objects. The property 
relationships that arise from the projection allow the individual to express 
himself in the outside world. Radin’s formulation of the personhood 
theory is labelled as an ‘intuitive view’, and suggests that people possess 
objects that they feel are almost part of themselves because they 
“constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world”.1 In 
order to differentiate between those property claims that originate from 
the binding of ones personality with an object, and those that derive from 
                                                     
 Teaching Fellow, Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College London. 
1 MJ Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957, 
959.  
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purely instrumental means, a personal/fungible dichotomy of property 
claims was introduced.  
It was noted in part I that the traditional role of a community in the 
personality theory of property is to act as an audience to property claims. 
In order to elevate the community to a position from which it can project 
its will into external objects requires a fundamental change in the way that 
society views a group, and also the inner workings of a group. In 
particular, the group must adopt one collective will that can be projected 
into the external world, rather than consisting of a collection of disparate 
and conflicting wills. Professor Waldron did not feel that such a change 
was an insurmountable hurdle, as the will of each individual is that “the 
goals of the community to which he belongs should be pursued and 
realised”.2 Therefore, the real task is in establishing the collective goal of 
the community, and uniting its members. 
The first step in the process of establishing a community that is able to 
project a united will into the external world was to establish which type of 
common-property regime this series of articles seeks to justify. After 
sampling a number of works, an undertaking that can be explored fully in 
part I of this series, it was established that the most sensible inquiry was 
to use the personality theory of property to justify a limited access 
common-property regime. As a result, and using the influential works of 
Professors Ostrom and Clarke, 3  six community characteristics were 
proposed. These characteristics are fundamental for the establishment of a 
community that has the potential to project its will and personality into the 
external world and establish personal-property claims over natural 
resources, thus giving rise to a limited access common. The required six 
community characteristics are: exclusion of non-members, mutual self-
interest, homogeneity of interest, cohesiveness, idiosyncratic regulation 
and sanctions.  
The closing assertion of part I of this series was that, if a community 
exhibits the six required characteristics, and as such possesses a united 
collective will, there is no reason why this will cannot be projected into 
the external world and embodied in objects and resources. The projection 
and embodiment of will in such a way gives rise to a personal-property 
claim, as understood by the personality theory of property, which should 
                                                     
2 J Waldron, The Right to Private Property (OUP 1988) 347. 
3 See in particular A Clarke, ‘Creating New Commons: Recognition of 
Communal Land Rights within a Private Property Framework’ (2006) 59(1) 
Current Legal Problems 319. 
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in turn defeat any competing fungible claims that often (but not always) 
characterise private property.  
 
1.1 Part II 
 
This instalment of the two-part article will apply the personality 
theory of property to the limited number of community claims that are 
recognised in English law. It will be shown that the personality theory of 
property is not yet operative in the community context, and does not 
protect community entitlement in the way that it protects the entitlement 
of private individuals. This instalment also explores why community 
entitlement to property fails to adhere to the personality theory, and points 
to the inconsistency between the nature of the community claim and the 
dominant narrative in property discourse. Finally, it will be suggested that 
whilst recent political initiatives purport to have given greater weight to 
community entitlements to property, this is in fact a ruse. The outcome of 
the policies aimed at recognising the community claim is little more than 
a perpetuation of the preference for private property initiatives.  
The reluctant conclusion of this article series is that a community of 
users cannot establish an entitlement to the resource that they use through 
the personality theory of property. Whilst in theory claims of a 
community should be respected in the same way as claims of individuals 
under the personhood perspective, this is impossible as long as the 
dominant narrative of property is that of the self-interested individual. The 
English legal system does not understand the nature of communal claims, 
and all attempts to introduce policies and mechanisms that recognise and 
accommodate community claims to land have proved ineffective. 
Allocation of, and entitlement to, natural resources not only relies on the 
dominant property narrative, but also the political climate in which the 
narrative is developed. The political climate is such that promoting 
community entitlement to property is not advantageous to realising the 
economic aims of the government, which, in light of the recent economic 
downturn, and negative economic forecast following the United 
Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, can only really favour 
the instrumental and fungible property claim.  
 
2 PERSONAL AND FUNGIBLE CLAIMS IN THE 
COMMUNITY CONTEXT 
 
Now that the theoretical framework of property and personhood and 
the requisite community characteristics have been identified, the 
remaining step is to assess the usefulness of the application of the 
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dichotomy in justifying communal property claims. If the property and 
personhood theory is a sound justification for limited access communal 
property claims, these communal claims should be protected, and 
prioritised insofar as they are personhood-constituting claims.  
However, Western legal systems do not, as a general rule, recognise 
communal property holding. There are only a small number of communal 
property claims that exist in English law, and even these are limited and 
under-developed. To assess whether the personhood perspective can 
justify these limited examples, they shall be analysed in the light of the 
personal/fungible dichotomy introduced in the first instalment of this two-
part article series. The examples that will be pursued are rights of 
common over common land, the town or village green regime and assets 
of community value. If the personhood perspective does apply to 
communal property claims, these claims should be protected from 
competing fungible claims and lead to a stable community entitlement to 
property. However, as will be seen, this is far from the reality. 
 
2.1 Competing Claims: The Continuum 
 
The methodology for assessing whether communal property claims 
adhere to the personality theory of property employs the use of a 
continuum. 
At either end of the continuum appear the personal/fungible 
dichotomous claims. Claims are then plotted on the continuum in a 
position that is commensurate with the level and nature of their interest. 
Those claims that are further towards the personal end of the continuum 
will have the status of personal-property claims, and those that appear 
towards the fungible marker will attain the status of fungible claims. In a 
clash of competing claims, those that are plotted further towards the 
personal marker will prevail over those that are plotted closer to the 
fungible marker; such is the normative effect of the personhood 
perspective. Therefore, if every claim could be plotted in this visualised 
way, there could be an instant assessment as to which claims should take 
priority over others. If two competing claims were plotted in exactly the 
same position, the method of adjudication between the claims would be a 
concept familiar to both property lawyers and the personality theory of 
property: time. The claim that was established first is the claim that takes 
priority. 
To illustrate the use of the continuum: figure 1 depicts a claim that 
would be treated as personal, and which would take priority over a claim 
plotted in the way that figure 2 depicts, which is fungible. There is a 
presumption that that those who hold land purely for instrumental value, 
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such as for commercial investment, will have a fungible claim to the 
property; and similarly those who use the land for residential or domestic 
purposes will be presumed to have a personal-property claim. However, 
the continuum does not shackle the property claim to its initial 
categorisation; the claim may move between fungible and personal, which 
is in accordance with Radin’s personhood theory,4 as the claim can be 
simply re-plotted.  
 
Furthermore, when adjudicating between competing claims, the 
continuum does not always assume that the paper-titleholder will only 
have a fungible claim, and that parties who use the land will establish a 
personal claim. The continuum allows the claims of all competing parties, 
or indeed communities, to be appropriately plotted on the continuum and 
document the wide range of interests that may exist. However, in order for 
the continuum to work satisfactorily, it is in fact the strength of the 
personal claim that should be documented on the continuum. For 
example, if person A valued their land as both an investment and as their 
home, and that value was evenly split, their interest would be plotted at 
the midpoint on the continuum. If person B only valued their land as their 
home, and had no regard for its value as an investment, their interest 
would be plotted almost squarely on the ‘personal’ marker on the 
continuum. If a competition arose between persons A and B over the land, 
the interest of B would be favoured on the basis that his interest leans 
further towards to personal end of the continuum than A’s. However, 
                                                     
4 MJ Radin ‘Property and Personhood’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957, 966-
967. 
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plotting the interests in that way has no regard to the relative strengths of 
the personal value that persons A and B place on their property; it is 
assumed that person A places a lesser personal value on his land simply as 
a result of him also having a fungible interest. It is conceivable, and 
perhaps even inevitable, that devaluing A’s personal interest as a result of 
a concurrent fungible interest will cause an injustice. For example, B may 
have no fungible interest in the land because it is a holiday home in a 
falling market, and it was always intended that he would derive enjoyment 
from the property from its occasional use and he accepted that there 
would be no financial gain (and perhaps even financial loss). On the other 
hand, person A attributes both a personal and fungible value to their land 
as it is their only home, and is their greatest investment in which all of 
their wealth has been invested. In that context, it is difficult to justify why 
B’s claim would trump that of A, as the continuum dictates, given the 
clear disparity of the value of the land in favour of A. Therefore, it is 
imperative that the continuum is instead used to evidence the strength of 
the personal claim, as opposed to the claim made on balance between the 
fungible and personal markers. To that end, person A’s interest would be 
plotted away from the midpoint of the continuum and further towards the 
personal marker; their personal claim is strong as the land is their only 
home. On the other hand, B’s claim would likely fall away from the 
personal marker; the land is only one of a number of homes that they 
inhabit, and is not imperative to their security and being.   
It should be also be noted that the personal/fungible dichotomy does 
not necessarily correlate to other dichotomies in property law, such as 
Rudden’s ‘things as thing’/‘things as wealth’, 5  or the ‘use 
value’/‘exchange value’ dichotomy. Use value, personal claims and things 
as thing cannot be used interchangeably. A commercial landholding may 
have a high use value, but would not be characterised as being valued for 
its status as a thing, nor as being subject to a personal claim. Therefore the 
scope of the inquiry in this article series is narrowly focused, and there are 
other possible frameworks that could be pursued in further work. 
 
2.2 Common Land 
 
The recognition of communal land rights in modern English law can 
be traced to the Commons Registration Act 1965, now replaced by the 
Commons Act 2006. The 1965 Act sought to preserve ancient commons 
                                                     
5 B Rudden, ‘Things as Thing and Things as Wealth’ (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 81. 
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through the registration of all communal rights and the land over which 
they were exercisable. The effect of the 1965 Act was that all commons 
must be registered, and a failure to register a right of common and the 
land over which it was exercisable resulted in its extinguishment.6 
Communal land rights are a limited class, and have been defined as a 
right to ‘take or use some portion of that which another man’s soil 
naturally produces.’7 The class comprises six rights of common: pasture 
(right to graze), piscary (right to fish), turbary (right to take turf for fuel), 
marl (right to take sand or gravel), pannange (right to allow pigs to 
forage) and estover (right to take timber for housing). New rights of 
common may be created, but the circumstances in which this may happen 
are greatly restricted; no new rights of common may be created by 
prescription over land that is already registered as common land, as 
stipulated by section 6(1) of the Commons Act 2006, and recently re-
affirmed in R (Littlejohns) v Devon County Council. 8  New rights of 
common may only be created over land that is already registered as a 
common through express grant, and these new rights of common may not 
exist in gross.9 If a new right of common is created over land that is not 
already registered as common land, this will trigger the registration of the 
land as a common, as per section 6(5)(b) of the Commons Act 2006. 
Finally, new grazing rights may be refused registration by the commons 
registration authority if the authority believes that the land cannot sustain 
the right and risks the over-exploitation of the land.10 Variations of rights 
of common may be refused on the same grounds.11 
The interests of the commoners (the collective name for those who 
hold a right of common) can be described as a personal-property claim for 
the purposes of the continuum, which should be plotted according to 
figure 1. The commoners do not use the land for financial profit, but for 
survival, sustenance, and in some cases, recreational value. Historically 
the use of the common allowed the commoners to source food, fuel and 
materials for building their homes. In the modern context it is more likely 
that the exercising of many of these rights of common will be for 
recreational purposes (such as fishing), and those that are more 
                                                     
6 Commons Registration Act 1965, s1(2)(b). 
7 GW Cooke, Cooke’s Inclosure Acts (V&R Stevens and Sons & Haynes 1864, 
4th ed) 5. 
8 [2016] EWCA Civ 446; [2015] EWHC 730 (Admin). 
9 Commons Act 2006, s6(3). 
10 Commons Act 2006, s6(6). 
11 Commons Act 2006, s7(5). 
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pragmatically focused and archaic are unlikely to be used. The anomaly to 
this observation would be grazing, as a commoner may graze animals on 
the common as part of their commercial farming activities, although the 
economic benefit of grazing may still be viewed as running to the heart of 
their survival and sustenance. Furthermore, the commons register 
typically protects ancient rights of common, and it is likely that the 
commoners have developed as a community through their use of the 
common. The use of the common is the defining factor of their 
community and is likely to be constitutive of its identity. It would be 
unlikely that the commoners would be satisfied with an alternative plot of 
land, even if that land were able to support the same rights of common, 
because of the ancient nature of the rights that often are being exercised. 
The land is part of the community heritage, and is valued for this reason. 
Therefore, the claim of the commoners is not a fungible claim; they have 
developed an attachment to the land, and thus their claim is personal. 
If the commoners do in fact establish a personal-property claim over 
the land, the use of the personhood perspective dictates that this should 
defeat the fungible interest of the landowner. In many ways this analysis 
holds true. The landowner is greatly restricted in the ways in which she 
may use the land, and may not carry out any works on the land such as 
fencing, erection of buildings or the digging of ditches or trenches without 
consent form the commons registration authority.12 Almost every action 
that will result in preventing or impeding the access to the common will 
require consent from the registration authority, 13  and in determining 
whether to grant the consent, the commons registration authority should 
have regard to the interests of those commoners who exercise rights of 
common. The effect of the registration of land as a common is to remove 
most of the fungible value of the land. The landowner is unlikely to be 
able to use the land for his own ends, and the value that he can extract 
from the land for himself will be limited.  
Contrary to first impression, it can be argued that the priority given to 
the personal property claim of the commoners is an illusion, and the 
scheme of commons registration does not entirely adhere to the 
personhood perspective. However, the challenge to the personhood 
perspective does not arise from the fungible interest of the landowner, but 
rather the general public interest. It will be remembered that this series of 
articles is concerned with establishing limited access commons through 
the use of the personhood perspective; this ambition is hindered with the 
                                                     
12 Commons Act 2006, s38. 
13 Commons Act 2006, s38(2)(a). 
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scheme of commons registration as the limited access common enjoyed 
by the commoners is also subject to open access rights. For example, the 
common may be subject to the rights of public access under the 
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, which prevents commoners 
from excluding persons who do not enjoy rights of common. Furthermore, 
commons councils must have regard to the public interest when 
discharging their functions,14 not just the interest of the commoners, as 
should the commons registration authority when determining whether to 
grant consent for works on the common.15 No special weight is given to 
the interests of the commoners in this balance of considerations.  
If the personhood perspective were to hold true, the wider public 
interest would not affect the personal-property claim of the commoners. 
The personhood perspective is only concerned with claims that can be 
attributed to a distinct, defined and united will. Typically this is the will of 
an individual, or, as this paper contends, the will of a community that 
exhibits the five required characteristics. The public interest is a wide 
category of interests that could not substantiate nor establish a claim 
under the personhood perspective, as it would not meet these 
requirements. Therefore the public interest should not affect the 
entitlement of a community who have established a personal-property 
claim. 
One reason for this tension between the interests of the public and the 
commoners, and the inconsistency between communal land rights in 
English law and the personhood perspective more generally, can be traced 
to the assertions of Professors Bromley and Clarke, which were noted in 
part 1 of this article series. There is a general and deep-set 
misunderstanding in our private property framework about the nature and 
different species of common-property. It is possible that this 
misunderstanding is manifested in the commons legislation of 2006 that 
appears to make provision for a limited access common, but is then 
subject to considerations that properly belong to an open access regime; a 
confusion that is not helped by peripheral legislation such as the 
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. 
A further way in which the commons registration system fails to 
protect the personal claim of the community can be found in the 
provisions that allow for deregistration of common land.16 If the personal 
claim of the local community is to be prioritised it seems inconsistent with 
                                                     
14 Commons Act 2006, s31(6). 
15 Commons Act 2006, s39(1)(c). 
16 Commons Act 2006, ss16-17. 
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that prioritisation to allow for deregistration of common land and rights of 
common. The legislation attempts to strike a balance between the 
community claim and the fungible claim of the landowner that at least 
acknowledges that the community should not be deprived of the utility of 
the natural resource. Sections 16(2) and 16(3) of the Commons Act 2006 
stipulate that, if the land to be deregistered is in excess of two hundred 
square meters, a parcel of replacement land must be registered as common 
land. However, if the area of land to be deregistered is smaller than two 
hundred square metres, section 16(4) does not require that replacement 
land be registered, but leaves the option open should the registration 
authority wish to do so.  
The voluntary registration of replacement land does not protect the 
community entitlement, as the common may be lost and no replacement 
provided. Furthermore, the provisions for mandatory registration of 
replacement land are not satisfactory for the purposes of protecting the 
personal community claim, as the notion of replacement land treats the 
claim of the community as fungible. It is assumed that the land that the 
community has enjoyed could be substituted for land that would be of 
equal value to the community; however, under the personhood 
perspective, this would not be possible, as the community would have 
bound its personality with the land. The nature of a personal claim is that 
the pain caused by the loss of the physical property cannot be remedied by 
providing replacement property. Replacement common land will not have 
the same historic connection to the commoners who hold ancient rights of 
common. To suggest that the replacement land is a sufficient mechanism 
for protecting the community entitlement is misguided, and does not 
conceptualise the claim of the community in the appropriate way. 
Finally, it may be argued that the community lacks the level of 
idiosyncratic regulation required in order to establish a collective will and 
a person-property claim in the first place. It is true that the commons 
registration scheme regime provides for some level of idiosyncratic 
regulation; part 2 of the Commons Act 2006 provides for the 
establishment of commons councils, which may manage the agricultural 
activities on the land, the vegetation on the land and the rights of 
common. However, the role of idiosyncratic regulation is diminished 
when it is remembered that the commons registration authority have the 
right to refuse registration of new grazing rights if it is thought that the 
land is unable to sustain this right. This decision-making power of the 
commons registration authority takes away some of the control from the 
commoners and the commons council, and places it with the state.  
It is clear that the strongest example of communal land rights in 
English law does not adhere to the personality theory of property, and the 
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personal-property claim of the community is not properly acknowledged 
and accommodated. The provisions for deregistration and replacement of 
common land, the removal of some of the commons council decision 
making power, the consideration of the public interest, and the fact that 
the instances in which new rights of common may be created are actually 
quite restricted all lead to the conclusion that the scheme of commons 
registration is not a an effective way of establishing a limited access 
common and community entitlement to land. 
 
2.3 Town or Village Green 
 
Another community claim that is recognised through the commons 
legislation of 1965 and 2006, and which will now be analysed through the 
use of the personhood perspective, is the town or village green. 
Land can be registered as a town or village green (‘TVG’) pursuant to 
section 15 of the Commons Act 2006 (previously section 22 of the 
Commons Registration Act 1965). Under the Commons Act it must be 
shown that the land has been used ‘as of right’ for lawful sports and 
pastimes for a period of at least twenty years by the inhabitants of a 
locality, or neighbourhood within a locality. The requirement that the use 
must be ‘as of right’ has been taken to mean the tripartite test of nec vi, 
nec clam and nec precario: that the use must be without force, without 
stealth and without the licence of the landowner.17 The rationale behind 
these factors was explained by Lord Hoffmann in R v Oxfordshire County 
Council, Ex p Sunningwell Parish Council as being that every legal 
system needs rules of prescription that protect long established de-facto 
enjoyment of land.18 Each of these three factors gives the landowner the 
opportunity to object to the use by the local inhabitants; if they do not 
object, they are deemed to have acquiesced in the use of the land. In 
essence, village green law is underpinned by the principles of prescription 
in English Law.19  
Village green registration confers rights of recreation upon the users 
of the land who are from the relevant locality or neighbourhood within a 
                                                     
17 R v Oxfordshire County Council, Ex p Sunningwell Parish Council [2000] 1 
A.C. 335, 350H (Lord Hoffmann).  
18 Ibid at 349D. 
19 Village green law is described as being “traceable” to prescription by Patten LJ 
in Taylor v Betterment Properties (Weymouth) Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 250 [36]. 
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locality.20 These use rights are arguably proprietary as they operate in rem 
and attach to the land; the rights of the local inhabitants (the community) 
survive any transfer or conveyance of the land. The practical effect of 
TVG status is that the land cannot be used in a way that is inconsistent 
with the use rights of the local inhabitants, which promotes the social 
value of land, often at the expense of the economic value of the land 
enjoyed by the landowner. Registration of land as a village green is often 
used as an attempt to thwart development, to the extent it has been 
referred to as “a weapon of guerrilla warfare against development of open 
land.”21  
The TVG is a paradigm clash of claims over land. On the one hand 
there is the landowner who believes that they are absolutely entitled to the 
land, its capital value and, in most cases, exclusive control over its 
management and the right to realise the capital value. On the other hand 
there is the community (the inhabitants of a locality or neighbourhood 
within a locality) who engage in long use of the land and attribute other 
values to it; it is a social space and a recreational area, a space to which 
sentiments attach- their children grow up using the land, memories are 
made there and relationships with the other users forged. For the 
landowner to realise the full potential of his entitlement he must be free of 
the interest of the community of users. He must be free to sell the land, 
build on it or put it to any use that he so wishes, even if this use is 
inconsistent with the community interest. For the community to realise the 
full potential of their entitlement their use must be protected, and all 
inconsistent uses and interferences must be prohibited. For the landowner 
and the community to co-exist it is a fine balance, and one that is easily 
tipped. Legally, the landowner is in a far superior position: he holds the 
title to the land, and the community interest is hostage to the way in which 
he chooses to exercise his ownership rights. To redress the balance, legal 
recognition of the community entitlement is required, and this recognition 
is achieved through village green status. 
If the interests of the local inhabitants and the landowner are plotted 
on the continuum, they occupy the positions depicted in figures 1 and 2 
respectively. The local inhabitants establish a personal-property claim, 
owing to the social value that they attribute to the land, whereas the 
                                                     
20 R (Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust) v 
Oxfordshire County Council [2010] EWHC 530 (Admin) [80] (HHJ Waksmann 
QC). 
21 R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council and Another [2010] 
UKSC 11 [48] (Lord Walker). 
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landowner leans towards a fungible claim. The local inhabitants would 
unlikely be satisfied with replacement land as any replacement land that 
had not been used for the requisite twenty year period would not have the 
same social value to the local inhabitants; there would be no long use 
from which the local inhabitants can form a connection constitutive of 
their identity. The landowner himself may have some tendencies that are 
consistent with a personal claim, however, by virtue of the fact that a 
community of users has been making use of the land for such a prolonged 
period it is unlikely that he regards the land as being constitutive of his 
personality. Furthermore, the landowner would likely be sufficiently 
compensated by either replacement land, or the monetary value of the 
land subject to the use of the local inhabitants. The consequence of these 
observations should be that the community entitlement takes priority over 
the entitlement of the landowner. This certainly appears to be the case at 
first glance, as the landowner is restricted in his entitlement to the land as 
he is prevented from using the land in a way that is inconsistent with the 
use rights of the local inhabitants. It seems as if the TVG regime adheres 
to the personhood perspective; however, the substance of the protection 
afforded to the community entitlement tells a rather different story. 
 Village green registration is not the stable protection of community 
entitlement that the personhood perspective envisages. Recent changes to 
the regime give a much weightier consideration to the landowner and the 
fungible claim, and markedly reduce the protection given to the personal-
property claim of the community. For example, The Growth and 
Infrastructure Act 2013 amended the Commons Act 2006 to introduce 
additional bars to registration of land as a TVG. Section 15C now 
provides that registration will be barred where a trigger event under 
schedule 1A, which are all linked to planning applications, has occurred. 
There is a tremendous housing land supply shortage in England and 
Wales, and the sterilisation of potential development sites by village green 
registration is proving controversial. Any landowner who is seeking to 
realise the value of his land through development can thwart the rights of 
the community by submitting a planning application, which then tips the 
balance of protecting entitlements back in his favour. Furthermore, the 
personal-property claim of the community can be defeated by showing 
that the local inhabitants used the land pursuant to a statutory right to do 
so, as established in R (Barkas) v North Yorkshire County Council.22 The 
circumstances in which a successful application for village green 
registration can be made are rapidly narrowing, and the community 
                                                     
22 [2014] UKSC 31. 
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entitlement is increasingly left without protection, regardless of the 
personal nature of their property claim. The fungible claim is taking 
precedence in the battle between competing claims.  
Additionally, the provisions that apply to deregistration and 
replacement of common land also apply to town and village greens. As 
explored above in the context of common land, these provisions are 
wholly inadequate for the purposes of protecting the community 
entitlement, and mischaracterise the community claim as fungible. 
The failure of the TVG regime to adhere to the personhood 
perspective and favour the personal claim is not an anomaly in English 
law. Most community entitlements suffer the same emasculated fate as the 
TVG legislation. The only way in which the failure of the personhood 
perspective in the context of the TVG can be defended is to question the 
characteristics of the community. It is questionable whether the local 
inhabitants possess all six of the characteristics required to present a 
united will that could be embodied in property in the way that Waldron 
suggested, as discussed in the first part of this article series and noted 
above. In particular, there may be an absence of idiosyncratic regulation. 
The community certainly possess the other required characteristics; 
indeed, the legal test for registering land as a village green requires them. 
The community must be cohesive and mutually self-interested, non-
members of the community upon whom no rights have been conferred can 
be excluded from the land, and there is homogeneity of interest, and 
sanctions in the law of trespass if the scope of the use rights is exceeded 
(although, these sanctions are not imposed by the community in the way 
that Professors Ostrom and Clarke suggested). However, there is no 
idiosyncratic regulation in the TVG community. The only control that the 
local inhabitants have over the use will be determined by reference to the 
use over the requisite twenty-year period; the scope of of the legal right 
acquired by the local inhabitants will be set according to the scope of the 
use over the twenty years, and the local inhabitants may not exercise any 
further control or use of the land that was not engaged in during the 
acquisition period. Therefore, it is the landowner himself who often 
regulates the use of the land and determines who else may use it, not the 
local inhabitants. Furthermore, when regulating the use of the land, the 
only duty by which the landowner is bound is a duty not to interfere with 
the use of the relevant inhabitants. 
In theory, the lack of idiosyncratic regulation weakens the argument 
for the community claim of a TVG to be protected though the framework 
of the personal-property claim. However, in reality the communities of 
local inhabitants often form interest groups that regulate the use and 
maintenance of the land, especially when the landowner has no use for the 
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land following its registration as a TVG. As with commons councils, the 
formation of these groups is not mandatory, nor are their regulations 
legally binding; yet, these groups are different from commons councils as 
they are not grounded in statute and afforded the same powers. 
Nonetheless, community interest groups do go some way to strengthening 
the presence of the required community characteristics. One example of 
such a group is ‘The Friends of the Trap Grounds’, which was established 
to campaign for the protection of the Trap Grounds in North Oxford. This 
land became the subject of the landmark case Oxfordshire County Council 
v Oxford City Council and Another,23 which, following lengthy litigation, 
resulted in the registration of an area of scrubland as a TVG (in in light of 
more recent case law it is unclear whether the land would be registered if 
these circumstances arose now). The interest group now runs regular 
‘work parties’ to maintain the land, holds an annual AGM, engages in 
educational activities and monitors the use of the land and wildlife. It 
seems very difficult in a situation such as this to suggest that the 
community does not possess the necessary characteristics to substantiate a 
personhood claim.  
 
2.4 Assets of Community Value  
 
The final community interest that will be considered in the framework 
of the personhood perspective is the asset of community value (‘ACV’) 
scheme, which was introduced as part of the wider movement of 
community empowerment under the Localism Act 2011. 
The Department for Communities and Local Government observed 
that “[o]ver the past decade communities have been losing local amenities 
and buildings of great importance to them|”. 24  A solution to this 
predicament that has been adopted is the assets of community value 
listing scheme, introduced by part 5, chapter 3, of the Localism Act 2011, 
and supplemented by the Assets of Community Value (England) 
Regulations 2012. The scheme allows community interest groups 25  to 
nominate land that is valued by the community to be included on a list of 
community assets. Land of community value is taken to mean land that 
“furthers the social wellbeing or social interests of the local 
                                                     
23 [2006] UKHL 25. 
24 Department for Communities and Local Government, Assets of Community 
Value- Policy Statement, September 2011, 4. 
25 See Assets of Community Value (England) Regulations, regulations 5, 12 and 
Localism Act 2011, s89 for definitions. 
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community”, 26  with ‘social interests’ further dissected to mean either 
religious, cultural or sport interests.27 If the land is accepted for listing the 
community interest is protected in the sense that, if the landowner chooses 
to dispose of the land,28 the community interest group are given a period 
in which to prepare a bid to purchase the asset. When the landowner 
indicates to the relevant authority his intention to sell, he triggers an 
interim period of six weeks (known as a ‘moratorium’) in which the 
community must express in writing its intention to make a bid.29 If the 
community interest group evinces this intention within the six weeks, this 
period is extended to six months, in which the community must prepare 
and present their bid to the landowner.  
On initial inspection, the ACV scheme appears to recognise a 
personal-property claim in favour of a community. The social interests of 
the community and its connection with the land is formally recognised 
and protected through the listing of the asset, which may in turn lead to its 
acquisition by the community. The claim of the community is treated as 
personal rather than fungible, as it is the particular listed asset that is 
protected, rather than the securing of a replacement asset.  
Allowing communities to list assets of social value, with a view to 
their possible acquisition, can be extremely beneficial to a community. 
For example, the moratorium period alleviates the pragmatic and 
organisational problems that would plague a community group trying to 
put together a bid, which a private individual would not face, and gives 
ample time for the bid to be drafted and agreed upon by all the community 
members. Furthermore, the facilities that can be listed as an ACV are 
wide-ranging and include pubs, recreation grounds and local amenities. 
Only residential dwellings are excluded from potential ACV listing.30 
Therefore the community interest is recognised in a diverse range of 
situations, and can be recognised over land that is privately owned.  
                                                     
26 Localism Act 2011, s88(1)(a). 
27 Localism Act 2011, s88(6). 
28 The only dispositions that are qualifying for these purposes are a disposition of 
the freehold interest with vacant possession and a grant of a lease for 25 years or 
more, see Localism Act 2011, s96; see also s95(5) for a list of excluded 
dispositions. 
29 Localism Act 2011, s95 and Assets of Community Value (England) 
Regulations, regulation 13. 
30 Assets of Community Value (England) Regulations, regulation 3 and schedule 
1. 
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The fungible property claim of the landowner will be restricted by the 
listing of their land as an ACV, as they are required to allow the 
community to bid and must wait for them to do so. In addition, the 
personal claim established by the community affects the fungible claims 
of the landowner as designation of land as an ACV is a material planning 
consideration.31 This may hinder or prevent the development of the land 
by a landowner who is seeking to realise their fungible claim over the 
land. When the interests are plotted on the continuum the claim of the 
community seems to align squarely with figure 1, with the claim of the 
landowner often at figure 2, and it seems that the personal interest does 
indeed outweigh the fungible interest. 
However, when more thoroughly analysed, designation of land as an 
ACV does very little to raise a presumption in favour of the community 
entitlement. For example, the type of group that can be recognised as a 
community interest group is limited by the statutory definition at 
regulations 5 and 12 of the Assets of Community Value (England) 
Regulations 2012. The group must have legal personality and be capable 
of holding title to property, which immediately discounts those 
communities that have not formalised their relationship in law, even if 
they have the required six characteristics. As noted throughout this article 
series, legal formalisation of the community relationship is a problem that 
plagues communal property arrangements more generally, and prevents 
de facto common-property arrangements being recognised in law. 
Furthermore, the right is neither a right to buy, nor a right of pre-emption; 
at best it is a right to be informed of the owner’s intention to sell or grant 
a lease for 25 years or more. The only real benefit of the listing of the 
asset, which the landowner can apply to have reviewed,32 is to afford the 
community a greater amount of time in which to assemble their bid, yet 
there is still no guarantee that the landowner will consider their bid. The 
only duty that ACV listing imposes on the landowner is a duty to wait and 
see if the community wish to bid for their land; it is little more than an 
inconvenience to him. Additionally, once the moratorium period expires, 
the landowner enjoys an eighteen month protected period where no 
                                                     
31 Department for Communities and Local Government, Assets of Community 
Value- Policy Statement September 2011, 4. See also Department for 
Communities and Local Government, Community Right to Bid: Non-Statutory 
Advice Note for Local Authorities October 2012, para 2.20. 
32 Localism Act 2011, s91. 
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further moratorium can be triggered.33 The community bid, and thus the 
personal claim of the community, is at the mercy of the market and other 
fungible claims over the land. A private purchaser could easily out-bid the 
community, or the landowner could wait out the moratorium period, and 
the personal-property claim of the community would be defeated by the 
landowner’s fungible claim as they sought to realise the highest value of 
the land. In substance, the ACV scheme does not adhere to the 
personhood perspective, and it does not operate to protect and prioritise 
the community claim.  
 
3 BARRIERS TO RECOGNITION 
 
The three examples given above demonstrate that the property and 
personhood theory does not hold true for communal property claims in 
England. If anything, the strength of the entitlements plotted on the 
continuum operates in reverse when a community makes the personal 
claim, as the claims plotted towards the fungible marker seem to represent 
a stronger entitlement. This seems difficult to accept, as the reason for 
attempting to protect and prioritise these claims is not because they are 
communal, but because they are personal-property claims, which, in the 
personhood perspective, carry the strongest entitlement. Private property 
enjoys the privilege of being able to invoke the personhood perspective, 
and there seems no reason why it should not extend to a community, 
provided that the community exhibits the requisite characteristics to attain 
personhood status. Therefore, there appears to be a prejudice against 
communal property entitlements.  
Professor Radin identifies what may be the cause of the failure of 
communal property claims to conform to the traditional application of the 
personhood perspective: 
 
“If a dichotomy telescoping this continuum to two end points is to 
be useful, it must be because within a given social context certain 
types of person-thing relationships are understood to fall close to 
one end or the other of the continuum, so that decision makers 
within that social context can use the dichotomy as a guide to 
determine which property is worthier of protection.”34  
                                                     
33 Assets of Community Value (England) Regulations 2012, regulation 13; 
Localism Act 2011, s95. 
34 MJ Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957, 
987. 
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Professor McDonald expresses the problem through the rights-duty 
correlate. He argues that if those who will be duty bound by the property 
rights that arise as the consequence of the communal property claim do 
not recognise those duties, there will be no recognition of the 
community’s property right. The group must be understood to be a right 
holder vis-à-vis others in society.35 
Therefore it seems that the continuum will only work when the 
relationship between the person and the thing to which the person is 
laying claim is understood. If the relationship is not understood, the 
entitlement of the person to the thing claimed will not be properly 
understood and respected. As the personhood perspective works perfectly 
well when an individual claims an entitlement to property (consider for 
example the rights of persons in of actual occupation contained in the 
Land Registration Act 2002), and the only variant presented in the 
application of the personhood perspective in this inquiry is to substitute 
the individual for a community, it must be the presence of the community 
that causes the application to fail. The simple fact is that the decision 
maker plotting the claims on the continuum in the context of the English 
legal system, and the conception of property that the English legal system 
employs, does not understand the person-thing relationship when the 
person is not an individual seeking to establish private property, but rather 
a community seeking to establish a communal entitlement. 
As the relationship between a community and a resource is not 
universally understood, it does not feature in the calculation for allocating 
resources. It is this lack of understanding about communal property that 
has ostracised community entitlement to natural resources, and prioritised 
private property and the fungible property claims of individuals over 
personal property claims of communities (as demonstrated above). For 
example, the lack of understanding about the nature of communal 
property is arguably what causes rights of common in the commons 
registration scheme to not enjoy an inherent priority over the claims of the 
general public. The open access rights of the general public usurp the 
rights of the commoners in the management of the common, as the wider 
‘public interest’ must be considered in the management strategies of the 
common. Indeed, the conflation between limited access and open access 
communal property is rife throughout the commons literature, and is a 
                                                     
35 M McDonald, ‘Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal 
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mistake that Hardin himself makes in his landmark paper ‘The Tragedy of 
the Commons’.36  
To conclude that the non-understanding of the person-thing 
relationship, where the person is in fact a community, is the cause of the 
failure of the personhood perspective in the context of community claims 
is not surprising. It is something that is both explicit and implicit 
throughout commons scholarship, and a major contributing factor in the 
marginalisation of communal property arrangements. The more pertinent 
question is why do the decision makers, and the English legal system, not 
understand the person-thing relationship between the community and the 
land. 
 
3.1 Universal Understanding of Property Signals 
 
The reason for the misunderstanding (or non-understanding) of 
communal claims can be found in the scholarship of Professor Rose, who 
discusses the signalling of property ownership. She notes that possession 
is typically the basis of ownership. Possession communicates or gives 
notice to others of the possessor’s entitlement, an entitlement that is 
recognised in law.37 Therefore, those who take possession of resources 
establish their entitlement and are recognised as owner. It is also often the 
case that the primary method of signalling entitlement, the act of taking 
possession, is supported through some secondary symbol, such as formal 
registration.  
Rose’s account of property signalling cannot accommodate the 
property signals that a community transmit to the rest of the world. In the 
examples given in this paper, and with communal property more 
generally, the community does not ‘possess’ the resource over which it 
lays its claim. Rather, the community establishes its entitlement by 
individual members of the community using the resource, and sharing it 
with the other members of the community. In the context of a private 
property framework this sharing does not signal an owner-like 
entitlement; there is no exclusion of all others from the resource in the 
way that Blackstone envisaged, and there is no act of possession by one 
person.   
Nonetheless, it seems that the English legal system has the potential to 
be able recognise a community entitlement to a limited access common; 
                                                     
36 G Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243. 
37 C Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric 
of Ownership (Westview Press Inc. 1994) 16, see also chapter one generally. 
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and it would require a small step to achieve this. It was noted in the first 
article in this series that, for a successful mutual self-interest common, the 
resource must be “just as private to the community as private property is 
to the private property owner.”38 It was further argued that the community 
must exclude non-members of the community from the use of the 
resource, which led to the observation that limited access communal 
property bears some resemblance to private property 39  (although this 
resemblance was later limited through an analysis of the alienability of 
communal property). If these contentions are true, it is difficult to 
understand why the personhood perspective does not hold true for the 
community claim in the same way as it does for private claims, as they 
both share the same core of exclusion rights. The characteristics of the 
group seem to mirror the private individual in such a way that should 
allow the personhood theory to justify the personal claim of the 
community. 
Therefore, there must be something else in the characteristics of the 
community that sets the quality and signalling of its personal claim aside 
from that of the individual. One possible solution is that, in reality, the 
community does not exclude others from using the resource, but rather 
they exclude others from exercising the same rights as themselves over 
the resource. For example, the local inhabitants in whose favour land has 
been registered as a TVG are able to exercise the rights of recreation that 
have been conferred on them, and no such rights are conferred on those 
who fall outside of the relevant locality or neighbourhood within a 
locality. Others may still use the land, but they may not do so in a way 
that is inconsistent with the rights of the local inhabitants, and the 
landowner may still exclude them. Similarly, only commoners who 
possess rights of common may exercise these rights, but this does not 
preclude others from using the common, provided that they do not 
interfere with the rights of common. Finally, those who fall outside of a 
community interest group do not enjoy the right to trigger a moratorium 
period when a landowner proposes to sell an ACV (however, it should be 
noted that the community interest group who triggers the moratorium does 
not necessarily need to be the same group that successfully applied for 
ACV listing of the land). 
                                                     
38 A Clarke, ‘Creating New Commons: Recognition of Communal Land Rights 
within a Private Property Framework’ (2006) 59(1) Current Legal Problems 319, 
329. 
39 C Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric 
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The above observations are important because, as argued by Professor 
Rose, the property signal “must be in a language that is understood, and 
the acts of ‘possession’ that communicate a claim will vary according to 
the audience”.40 The audience in the context of the English legal system 
are those who operate in a private property framework. This audience 
does not understand shared use where the only exclusion is from the 
particular bundle of use rights exercised by a community. Such use is not 
an act of possession that will communicate a claim to the audience, as it is 
not communicated in a language that the audience will understand, and 
this is the crux of the problem for the community claim. Whether the 
property claim is fungible or personal makes no difference for a 
community; the real hurdle is that the audience understands the property 
signals of individuals, not communities.  
 
3.2 Dominant Property Narrative 
 
The audience to property signals understand the dominant narrative of 
property discourse, and this narrative and understanding of the institution 
of property does not accommodate communal entitlement. The dominant 
narrative suggests that individuals have a natural desire to possess 
property. “The first instinct of the individual is to live and to prefer their 
own lives to the lives of others”,41 and life depends on property and the 
ability to appropriate resources for individual sustenance. 42  Therefore, 
there is the desire to keep resources for one’s self and, when those 
resources become scarce, exclude others from sharing in its use; this has 
become widely regarded as the classical view of property.  
Therefore, in a world of scare resources, individuals become 
concerned with private property and maximising their entitlement in the 
allocation of resources. Individuals want to retain resources for their own 
use, and will exclude others to do this. Under the dominant narrative, this 
proposition is true even in communal property arrangements. The choices 
that face the individuals in a common-property arrangement where there 
is not enough of the resource to satisfy the preferences of every individual 
can be demonstrated in the well-known prisoners’ dilemma diagram 
below. In the diagram, to ‘cooperate’, members of the community would 
need to forgo some of their own use of the resource to ensure that the 
                                                     
40 Ibid at 16. 
41 T Hobbes, Leviathan (Prometheus Books, 1988) chapter 20. 
42 J Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
second treatise, sec. 28. 
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resource can sustain the use of the other members of the community. To 
‘cheat’, members of the community would maximise their use of the 
resource and take all that they can, with little regard for the amount of the 
resource remaining for the use of other members of the community. 
 
 A. cooperates A. cheats 
B. cooperates A gets a good allocation, B 
gets a good allocation. 
A gets lots, B gets nothing. 
 
B. cheats B gets lots, A gets nothing. 
 
A gets a small allocation, B 
gets a small allocation. 
 
If ‘lots’ is taken to be x, a ‘good allocation’ is > x/2. A ‘small 
allocation’, would then be < x/2. This makes it easy to see which 
combination of actions give rise to the best solution for all, and the 
greatest overall product of the resource: 
 
Cooperate - cooperate 2 ( > x/2) 
Cheat - cooperate x 
Cooperate - cheat x 
Cheat - cheat 2 (< x/2) 
 
The best solution for the members of the community entitled to use 
the resource is to adopt a cooperate-cooperate arrangement, as the 
cumulative product of the resource is enhanced: 2( > x/2) = > x. If a cheat-
cooperate or cooperate-cheat situation emerges, then the resource will 
only ever produce x, and if a cheat-cheat situation occurs the resource will 
not even produce x as 2(< x/2) = < x.  
By choosing a cooperate-cooperate scenario, every member of the 
community will get a good allocation of the resource to meet their needs, 
and the resource can sustain the allocation and use. Furthermore, the 
cumulative product of the resource is enhanced. Therefore, to make a 
common-property regime work, every member of the community must 
choose to cooperate.  
However, Professor Rose illustrates that the cooperate-cooperate 
arrangement is rarely reached.43 The preference orderings of individuals 
do not lead to a relationship of sharing in which entitlements are equal, 
but rather a relationship in which the individual making the decision 
whether to cooperate or not gains the greatest possible entitlement. This 
does not mean that individuals do not wish for others to get a good 
                                                     
43 C Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric 
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allocation of the resource, and they are happy for others to receive an 
equally valuable allocation as themselves, provided that it does not 
impinge on their own. It is when the allocation of others affects their own 
allocation that individuals develop the ruthless self-interest that leads 
them to exclude others from the resource. The individual self-interest 
develops in order to protect ones’ own allocation, and will always arise 
when the resource becomes scarce.  
Even those anomalous individuals who do not follow the classical 
theory of property and choose to share property fall foul of the prisoners’ 
dilemma when the resource becomes scare; they too do not choose a 
cooperate-cooperate strategy. For example, those members of society who 
buck the trend and are benevolent have a genuinely greater concern for 
others than they do for themselves will opt to go without. They will opt to 
participate in a cooperate-cheat arrangement, in which they cooperate. 
Although this achieves their aim of giving others a greater allocation of 
the resource, it does not maximise the cumulative product of the resource.  
Professor Rose suggests that the only individuals that will engage in a 
cooperate-cooperate arrangement and pursue the collective well-being 
will be those who “[do] not put her own well-being above yours, but is 
not a fool about needless self-sacrifice either”.44 She also demonstrates 
through a thought experiment that these individuals are in the minority,45 
and that a cooperate-cooperate arrangement will only exist if all the 
members of the community share this disposition. As soon as one self-
interested individual infiltrates the community, there will be a ‘cheat’, and 
the product of the resource diminishes.  
In short, the majority of society is either far too self-interested, or 
keen to fall on their sword, to choose a cooperate-cooperate scenario and 
maximise the product of the resource for the collective well-being.  
 
3.3 Consequences 
 
If the dominant narrative is as presented, it is no wonder that a 
community of users who select a cooperate-cooperate relationship and 
successfully manage a resource are not understood. Whether their claim is 
fungible or personal makes no difference, it is the prospect of having a 
successful communal property regime in which this claim can exist that is 
the stumbling block for the community. If the dominant narrative could 
rationalise communal property, then there would be no reason why the 
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personal claim of a community could not be understood in the same way 
as that of an individual. However, as long as the cooperate-cooperate 
scenario and use by sharing is in the minority, this seems unlikely to 
happen. 
It seems that Radin is correct to say that if the decision maker who is 
plotting the claim on the continuum and the audience to that claim do not 
have the necessary level of understanding, the dichotomy is useless as a 
guide to assessing which claims are worthier of protection. It makes no 
difference where the community claim is plotted on the continuum, as the 
person-thing relationship is not understood, and therefore the dichotomy 
is ineffective as a tool for adjudicating between competing claims of a 
community and a landowner. The outcome of plotting the community 
claim towards the marker of a personal claim, in practice, leads to a 
greater weight being placed on the fungible claim of the landowner, as it 
is the only recognised claim. This is in line with the dominant narrative 
that expects individuals to use resources by excluding others, and claims 
made by those who do not exclude others do not signal a claim that is 
recognised and protected when plotted on the continuum. If the interest 
plotted towards the personal marker had been that of an individual 
claimant, the personhood perspective would have operated to prioritise 
this claim and recognise that individual’s better entitlement against all 
fungible claims. However, in a narrative where the focus is on 
maximising individual wealth and entitlement, the community claim, and 
the maximising of collective well-being and sharing, will never be 
understood. 
 
4 CHANGING THE DOMINANT VOICE IN PROPERTY 
NARRATIVE 
 
Professor Rose notes that the “dominant storyteller can make his 
position seem the natural one”.46  Therefore, as long as it is the self-
interested individual that is directing the property narrative, there seems 
little prospect of re-weighting the balance of the continuum to favour the 
personal claim of a community against fungible claims made by private 
individuals.  
In her exposition of the personhood perspective, Radin suggests that a 
government concerned with the just distribution of resources could use the 
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personhood dichotomy as the source of a “distributive mandate”.47 Under 
such mandate it would be the responsibility of the government to ensure 
that all citizens have the resources necessary to fully constitute their 
personhood. This may go so far as to require the government to 
“rearrange property rights so that the fungible property of some people 
does not overwhelm the opportunity of the rest to constitute themselves in 
property.”48 Furthermore, if the concern is securing the resources required 
by each citizen to fully constitute themselves, it seems inconsistent not to 
afford the same concern to communities, especially where individuals can 
only constitute their personhood and identity within a community.  
Interestingly, it seemed possible that there may be a shift in the 
dominant narrative of property rights. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government of 2010-2015 set out to pursue a policy of 
empowering local communities, and give effect to community claims to 
resources. This is a policy that has supposedly been pursued for some 
time; in 2008 the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, pledged to pursue 
polices “enhancing the power of communities”, “ensuring that their voices 
were heard” and “helping people…set and meet their own priorities”.49 In 
2010 David Cameron was elected as Prime Minister with his vision of the 
‘big society’, the ideology that communities should be empowered to 
solve their own problems, via a transfer of power from the state to the 
people and local communities. The end goal was to “create communities 
with oomph- neighbourhoods who are in charge of their own destiny’ and 
communities that feel they can ‘shape the world around them”.50  
The ‘big society’, whilst eventually abandoned, has resulted in a 
number of initiatives, which, although grounded in public law, have 
consequences for the allocation of, and entitlement to, resources. A prime 
example of such an initiative is the assets of community value scheme, 
discussed above. Another example of the ‘big society’ ideology in 
practice is a scheme that allowed local communities to apply to the ‘Big 
Society Bank’, a fund sourced by the state using the proceeds of dormant 
bank accounts, to receive funding to improve and support their 
                                                     
47 MJ Radin ‘Property and Personhood’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957, 
990. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Department for Communities and Local Government, Communities in Control: 
Real People, Real Power (Cmd 7427, 2008) foreword. 
50 David Cameron, 18 July 2010. Quoted from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/7897445/David-
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community. Four pilot areas were chosen, and the problem that these 
communities sought to address when given the power and funding to do 
so were problems of resource management. Communities in Windsor and 
Maidenhead sought to manage their local park and protect the community 
entitlement to use it, which entailed preventing development and use that 
was inconsistent with the social value that the community placed on the 
park. In addition, a community in Cumbria sought to secure funding to 
purchase their local pub that was in danger of closure. The community 
had formed an attachment to the pub over many years, providing the basis 
for a personal-property claim, which the funding from the ‘Big Society 
Bank’ helped realise.  
First impressions of these schemes seem to suggest that the 
community claim over resources, and the entitlement to manage and 
direct how a resource should be used, is being recognised. Not only that, 
but the government are also actively promoting and enabling communities 
to realise their claim and entitlements. Most of the schemes stop short of 
transferring title to the land and resources in question to the local 
community, not least because of the limited capacity of groups to hold 
legal title to property, but there does seem to be a shift in the right 
direction. However, as has already been exposed with the examined 
community claims above, first impressions can be deceiving.  
 
4.1 Trojan Horse 
 
In reality, the idea of the ‘big society’ and empowering communities 
has had very little positive impact on community property claims. There 
has been no favouring of community entitlements as a result of the 
policies implemented, especially not when the community claims clash 
with those of private landowners. In fact, many of the policies 
implemented perpetuate the favouring of private property claims, but have 
all the clothing of respecting community entitlement. Communities were 
sold a false package under the coalition government; the understanding of 
communal property claims is just a façade, and the dominant narrative of 
property is just as prevalent as it ever was. The initiatives supposed to 
promote community property entitlements are little more than a Trojan 
Horse, perpetuating the preference for private property arrangements and 
individual wealth maximisation. 
The reason for the continuing dominant narrative is easily explained. 
The political and economic climate of 2010-2015 did not lend itself to 
recognising community entitlements. The priority of the government has 
been to combat the recession and oversee the economic recovery of the 
country, and policies appropriate to this aim were pursued. In the 
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framework of sustainable development, the economic aim was prioritised 
over the social and environmental aim. This immediately marginalises 
personal-property claims, especially those of a community, that carry little 
or no financial value. Instrumental property has more immediate value for 
the economy, and is more conducive to an upward economic trend, than 
property that is claimed on the basis of some emotional or social 
connection with others in a community.  
There are clear examples of the coalition government actively 
pursuing the economic aim of sustainable development and seeking to 
realise the economic value of land, rather than the social value and 
community entitlement. One clear example can be taken from the 
communal property arrangements discussed earlier in this paper, the town 
or village green. Whilst it may be true that TVG status is used as “a 
weapon of guerrilla warfare against development of open land”,51 the act 
of the local inhabitants applying to register and protect the land cannot be 
ignored. Even if the application for TVG registration is what an objective 
observer may call ‘vexatious’, the fact remains that the local inhabitants 
as a community felt they had established a connection to the land that 
should be recognised and prioritised over the fungible claim of a 
developer or landowner. Provided that the legal test of section 15 of the 
Commons Act 2006 is met, it does not really matter what the motivation 
for the application and the community claim of entitlement is. However, 
the coalition government has not taken this strict stance, and have instead 
opted to amend the Commons Act 2006 through the Growth and 
Infrastructure Act 2013, as noted earlier in this paper. The effect of the 
amendments is to make it much harder to register land as a TVG, as 
section 15C of the Commons Act 2006 now contains a number of trigger 
events that will bar registration as a village green. All of these trigger 
events relate to planning applications over the relevant land, and thus 
prioritise the aim of development and maximising the economic value of 
the land, often at the expense of the social value attributed to the land by 
the local community. In essence, the fungible claim takes priority over the 
personal claim of the local inhabitants. The power of local communities to 
protect land that is important to them through the mechanism of TVG 
registration has been greatly diminished, and is now little more than a 
mechanism for favouring the fungible claim when the personal and 
fungible claims clash. 
                                                     
51 R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council and Another [2010] 
UKSC 11 [48] (Lord Walker). 
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The lack of protection for land valued by communities is hardly 
surprising, especially given that development and house-building have 
been the primary tools used by the coalition government to fuel the 
economic recovery. The government were never seriously going to favour 
the social aim of land and promote community entitlement, especially if 
that entitlement could impinge on the economic value of land. It is often 
the case that by recognising the social value of land, and community 
entitlement, the land becomes economically sterile and protected from 
development, with the TVG regime being a prime example. The National 
Planning Policy Framework explicitly adopts the stance that “significant 
weight should be placed on the need to support economic growth through 
the planning system”,52 highlighting the preference for, and greater weight 
placed on, the instrumental value of land.  
The political climate also goes some way to explaining why the assets 
of community value scheme is diluted to the point of being inadequate to 
protect community entitlement to the local resources that they value. It is 
not on the political agenda of the Conservative party to inhibit the 
freedom of the property owning classes when they come to dispose of 
their property. Landowners can voluntarily enter into options to purchase 
and rights of pre-emption, but they will not be unilaterally imposed on a 
landowner in the way that would be necessary for the scheme to really 
recognise the community entitlement to resources that they use and value 
(note the stark contrast here with the Scottish community right to buy 
scheme). The ACV listing scheme only pays lip service to the notion of 
community entitlement to property, and in reality still perpetuates the 
private property claim of the landowner. The effect of the protected period 
afforded to the landowner, coupled with the possibility that the 
community bid could be outweighed by a private and fungible bid, or 
indeed that a private bid may even be preferred, rids the scheme of any 
real potential to protect community rights.  
On the whole, it seems that when considering the allocation of 
resources and the structure of property rights it is not only necessary to 
consider the dominant property narrative, but also the wider political 
context in which that narrative takes place. When this is done, only one 
conclusion can be reached: the dominant narrative of property has not 
changed. The interest of private wealth is still favoured, and property 
rights have not been arranged to prevent the fungible property of 
                                                     
52 Department for Communities and Local Government, National Planning 
Policy Framework March 2012, para 18. 
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individuals overwhelming the opportunity of communities to constitute 
themselves in property.  
Sadly, it seems unlikely that the status quo will change anytime soon. 
At the time of editing this instalment of the article series it is less than a 
week since the United Kingdom held a referendum to determine its 
membership of the European Union. As the readership of this journal will 
know, a slim 52% majority of the electorate voted to leave the European 
Union, with a voter turnout of 72%. There are grave predictions of a 
negative economic shock and continued uncertainty. Already some of 
these predictions ring true, the pound sterling has fallen and risen sharply, 
as have the markets, and the country is in political turmoil. Against this 
volatile backdrop it seems most unlikely that any government that 
eventually finds itself in control will pursue anything other than achieving 
the most financially viable and economically supportive use of land, no 
matter what that governments underlying ideology may be. Such a policy 
direction will likely result in the continued favouring of private property, 
and community claims will continue to fall by the wayside.  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
Natural resources, such as land, are predominantly subject to private 
property claims. Whilst this is in line with the classical Blackstonian view 
of property, it fails to recognise the nature of the multitude of competing 
claims that exist over land. Some of these claims do not correspond with 
the traditional view of ownership, and focus on use by sharing rather than 
use by exclusion, and the right of a number of defined people to use the 
resource. English law does not generally recognise communal ownership, 
at least where there are more than four owners,53 despite these communal 
claims existing in abundance. Until a legal mechanism is developed that 
can accommodate these communal property entitlements in our 
predominantly private property system, such claims will never attain more 
than a de facto status. 
The first step towards recognising communal property claims and 
accommodating them in a classical view of property is to justify the 
communal claim. This two-part article has sought to achieve this 
justification by using the personality theory of property, a theory that is 
usually applied to justify private property claims. The theory makes a 
normative claim; that personal-property claims should be prioritised over 
                                                     
53 The amount of legal title holders over land is limited to four, as per the Law of 
Property Act 1925, s34(2). 
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fungible claims, and that in the event of a clash between the two, there is a 
prima facie case that a fungible claim should yield to personal claims, 
save for exceptional circumstances. It has been argued that if a 
community can demonstrate a degree of cohesiveness, homogeneity of 
interest and mutual self-interest, idiosyncratic regulation and the practice 
of excluding non-members, it is possible that it can establish a group 
personhood and establish a personal claim to property. This in turn should 
take precedence over the fungible claims of landowners, and the 
community entitlement to land should be protected. The consequence will 
be that the use rights of the community are protected against inconsistent 
uses by the landowner, the community will have some rights of 
management and control over the land, and in some cases may even result 
in the transfer of title to the resource (provided there is an appropriate 
legal mechanism that allows communities to hold the legal title to 
property, which at present is difficult to achieve).  
In practice, the personhood perspective rarely holds true for 
community property claims, and even in the limited instances where it 
does, the community entitlement is so heavily qualified that it does little 
to protect the personal-property claim of the community. The reality is 
that personal property claims established by communities often yield to 
the fungible claims of private landowners, and the few mechanisms that 
are present in English law to protect personal claims made by 
communities actually perpetuate this state of affairs. The scheme of listing 
assets of community value provides virtually no protection at all for the 
community entitlement, and the town or village green regime has become 
so diluted through economic policy that registering land as a TVG is now 
almost impossible where the land has any commercial value that could be 
realised.  
The reason why the personhood perspective fails to justify community 
claims to land is not surprising. The classical view of property has 
become the dominant property narrative, and this narrative focuses on the 
self-interested individual who seeks to maximise their own wealth and 
exclude others from scarce resources. This narrative does not account for 
those who use land whilst sharing it with others, or those individuals who 
form a group of users that aim to enhance the collective well-being. 
Communal property has been marginalised, and communal property 
arrangements are seldom understood. As long as the property signals of a 
community are not understood by the audience in the context that they are 
made, personal-property claims established by communities will never be 
given the same status as those established by private individuals. 
Furthermore, until there is a better understanding of communal property 
arrangements by both the policymakers who plot the interests on the 
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personal/fungible dichotomous continuum, and the audience who receive 
the property signals generated by the claim, the common-property 
arrangements that do exist will continue to be ineffective. For example, 
the scheme of commons registration in England could be much more 
effective in protecting the rights of the commoners. Yet, until there is a 
better understanding about the differences between limited access and 
open access commons, and the tension that occurs between the two, the 
commons registration scheme will never reach its full potential. 
Some attempt has been made to address the imbalance between 
private and communal property entitlements, such as the assets of 
community value listing scheme and the big society project. However, 
these attempts have achieved very little, and have been hindered by the 
overarching aim of the collation and subsequent governments to revive 
the economy. Only policies that furthered the economic aim have been 
seriously pursued, some of which detrimentally affect community claims 
over land. The standout example of this is the Growth and Infrastructure 
Act 2013, enacted with the aim of promoting development and realising 
the economic value of land, even if that land could be subject to a 
personal-property claim of a community (such as TVG status). The 
instrumental value of resources and the fungible property claim has taken 
priority, and until the political climate changes, it is difficult to see how 
the dominant property narrative will either. 
Therefore, until communal property claims are placed on a level 
footing with private property claims it seems unlikely that communal 
property entitlements will be justifiable, properly recognised or 
accommodated in English law. Equality between the two claims will 
entail the changing of the dominant property narrative, and until the 
political climate is such that will enable this to happen, it seems unlikely 
to be achieved. The Blackstonian classical view of property has held fast 
for hundreds of years, and unless there is some radical change in view, it 
seems that communal property arrangements will remain only de facto 
arrangements, searching for some validity and recognition in a world of 
private property claims. 
